Yemen - What Lies Ahead?

Michael Young

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Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi was sworn in as president. Mohammed Huwais/Agence France-Presse - Getty Images.

In a sense, the people of Yemen have emerged largely victorious out of the Arab uprisings that have shaken the region since early 2011. In November last year, Yemen’s president of thirty-three years Ali Abdullah Saleh finally announced that he was going to step down amid mounting protest and rising violence. However he only announced this once he could be sure that he will be immune from any prosecution, and his family can still control most of Yemen including the armed forces. His successor, Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi, was sworn in as president just last month after elections which have been hailed as representing a ‘new beginning’ for Yemen (despite there being only one candidate to choose from on the ballot, and him winning by 99.6% of the vote). Yemen is therefore going through its first political transition for the first time in a generation, but what lies ahead for the poorest country in the Middle East which is on the verge of economic collapse and currently a hotspot for al-Qaeda?

The change in Yemen received much less Western media coverage than that prescribed to countries such as Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and arguably Bahrain. In recent years, the main stories to come out of Yemen have focused on the presence of affiliate ‘Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’ (AQAP) within the country, supposedly operating as an affiliate of al-Qaeda itself. But with the killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki by a US drone last year, which Obama labelled as a “major blow to al-Qaeda’s most operational affiliate”, it is clear that the West has taken upon itself to disrupt terrorist operations in the country. 

The situation in Yemen is important. Since the failed Christmas Day bombing of a US airliner over Detroit, and the failed Cargo Plane bombs in 2010, Yemen is now considered as a stronghold for al-Qaeda inspired terrorism – a place where terrorists can easily plan, plot and organise attacks against targets in Europe and the US. Any instability in Yemen provides terrorists with an opportunity to expand and recruit – in fact, it is thought that the West were initially hesitant to accept that Saleh must go, due to his compliance with the West over the issue of al-Qaeda and the fact that collapse of the regime and the resulting anarchy could enable al-Qaeda to take an even stronger presence in the country. Saleh had been submissive to the demands of the West and was a vital ally against al-Qaeda in the region, allowing the US to train Yemeni personnel in the fight against AQAP. 

Upon being sworn into office, Hadi vowed to continue the war on al-Qaeda in the country just like his predecessor. Yet the first terrorist incident in the country under the new regime occurred within just hours of his inauguration, when a car bomb in the south-east city of Mukalla exploded, killing 26. It is clear that the new regime is going to need a considerable amount of help from the West to combat al-Qaeda. Since the attempted Christmas Day and Cargo Plane bombings, the US recognises that it needs to invest heavily in counterterrorism in the country. It is reportedly spending tens or maybe hundreds of millions on it, mainly training Yemeni soldiers.

It is not simply al-Qaeda which is causing divisiveness in Yemen – the country has the problem of many different tribal factions competing for power. There are secessionist movements operating in a South and have been for some time – they are unlikely to be appeased by the Hadi. Rebel tribes have made themselves known in recent years, attacking oil pipelines which have made the availability of oil even scarcer – Yemen is forced to now import oil from neighbouring countries, driving up the price even further. There is also a serious water shortage, and it is thought that Sana’a could be the world’s first capital city to run out of water.

Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle East, and its economy has been close to collapsing, even before the unrest started last year. Unemployment is high, food prices are constantly rising, and power cuts are daily – all of which contributed to the discontent against Saleh last year. It is thought that through this domestic struggle, and most notably through the poverty which is rife in the country, that al-Qaeda is managing to garner support.

It is unclear what the UK’s current attitude is towards Yemen. The government seems to be acting prudent, largely leaving the US to combat the al-Qaeda splinter group within the country. Hopefully the regime change will bring about the stability that the Yemeni people so badly need, and Hadi will address the internal problems that are not only plaguing the country’s economy but also strengthening al-Qaeda. A strong, stable and anti-extremist Yemen is in the interest of the UK and the West – it is one of the only countries in the region that al-Qaeda seem currently able to operate with ease. From a counterterrorism perspective, securing Yemen should be a foreign policy objective for 2012.

North African Migration Problem Resurfaces

Jevon Whitby

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Immigration as an age-old problem has resurfaced. noborder network.

With the Arab Spring almost resolved, will the West approve of the 'new' North Africa? Despite the  region's new political regimes, one age-old problem remains for Europe: immigration. This week the issue resurfaced in the media once again as Italy was censured for sending Eritrean and Somalian migrants back to Libya in 2009, a move which the European court in Strasbourg ruled required compensation of $20,000 to each of the men in question who were forcibly returned to Tripoli.

The proximity of Italy and Spain with North Africa has always caused particular problems regarding illegal immigration to Europe, resulting in a series of 'deals' between North African and European states to impose strict immigration controls.

In 2008 the problem seemed to be curtailed by a 'friendship pact' between Italy and Libya to deport migrants back to the North African Coast, an arrangement which groups such as Human Rights Watch have insisted was a circumvention of Italy's humanitarian obligations. Such deals are not unusual however, Spanish authorities agreed $390m in aid for Morocco in return for harsh immigration limits imposed in 2003, although Italy's preventative measures remain by far the most expensive precedent at $5 billion. Understandably, with Italy's involvement in Operation Odyssey Dawn and the fall of 'Gaddafi's Libya,' their immigration control arrangements were effectively ended as of 2011.

Illegal immigration has of course worsened due to the disorder of the Arab Spring. Despite dramatically falling numbers since the record estimated influx of 54,000 migrants in 2008 and Italy's subsequent immigration control pact with Libya, wars and strife have displaced large groups of people during the past year, causing the number of North Africans attempting to cross the Mediterranean to rise to 58,000 arrivals a year in 2011. In the first three months of 2011 alone, an estimated 18,000 Tunisians arrived in 'boats' at the tiny Italian island of Lampedusa. The UNHRC declared 2011 the 'deadliest year,' with an estimated 1,500 migrants killed from failed crossings.

As ever with immigration issues, the problem is a central policy issue for a number of nations aside from those nearest the Mediterranean. Once into Europe, many immigrants continue north to Germany, France and the UK, seeking work despite Europe's severe unemployment problem with 24 million people unemployed. In 2011, the French government was even prepared to pay 300 Euros to each Tunisian who was prepared to volunteer to return home, although as the BBC showed, some migrants pay in excess of 1000 Euros to be smuggled into Europe by traffickers. The United Kingdom currently stands as the nation with the largest Somali community in Europe, an estimated 108,000 as of March 2010, making the issue universally important for even the furthest corners of the EU.

What might be done to stem the tide of new immigrants attempting a dangerous voyage to an ever hostile Europe? Order and stability in Libya and Tunisia will of course deter marginal cases from the difficult crossing, as does seasonal bad weather. As for immigrants from further south, British Government attempts to re-stabilise Somalia came to a head in February with the 'London Conference on Somalia.' Representatives from forty governments were present, aiming to continue the work of pro-government forces and put in place what the Foreign Office described as a 'sustainable funding package' for African peacekeeping forces from Ethiopia and Kenya. 

Last May, in a speech to the House of Commons, the 'consequences for migration' were listed as the third reason for intervening in Libya. However at this February's Conference, the more prioritised dangers are the issues of piracy and terrorism. It is hoped that humanitarian assistance and political stability can encourage many migrants to stay in Somalia, although Foreign Secretary William Hague acknowledged the ambitious nature and long-term nature of the results stating: 'We cannot turn Somalia around with one conference.' 

In the short term, some form of strict border control, as Italy implemented in 2008, will be needed once again should the immigration problem continue at 2011 levels. The EU has shown willing to deploy its own border controls if necessary: tasking Frontex (the European border security agency) in February 2011 to begin 'Operation Hermes' and patrol the Mediterranean with naval vessels. Here indeed the international nature of the problem is most obvious: the operation included thirteen of the EU's member states.

It is a grim indictment of the situation that some of the compensation legally owed to the migrants in question cannot be paid, for two are already feared dead from a failed second crossing. Nevertheless given the morally dubious high rate of success from Italy's last arrangement with Libya, and now NATO nations being able to 'call in favours' with new North African governments, it seems likely that 2011 will have been a limited window for illegal immigration from the region; one soon to be closed.

Syria: The Question of Intervention

Geoffrey Howard

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Feb. 22, 2012, a house on fire after Syrian government shelling in Baba Amr, Homs province, Syria. (AP/Local Coordination Committees in Syria) CBS News

The appalling brutality of the Syrian regime has been laid bare over the past few weeks, with the siege of Homs claiming over 500 lives and leading to the start of a full-scale humanitarian crisis in the beleaguered opposition stronghold.  Syria’s 11-month old uprising grows more gruesome by the day.  Ban Ki Moon, the UN Secretary-General, said in New York: “I fear that the appalling brutality we are witnessing in Homs, with heavy weapons firing into civilian neighbourhoods, is a grim harbinger of things to come”. 

The past week has also, however, laid bare the complexity and political chicanery involved in international diplomacy and foreign policy.  In the context of such harrowing media news, Russia and China’s veto of the UN Security Council’s resolution struck many as not only cruel and selfish, but as the ‘green light’ that Assad needed to launch his attack on the opposition with a new and resolute cruelty.

However, we must not assume that the Security Council Resolution was the best thing for Syria. Its wording and intentions were extremely bold, promising to go far beyond the remit of sanctions or diplomatic pressure. The resolution demanded the withdrawal of the Syrian army from the streets with no parallel demand on armed rebel groups, with a provision for "further measures" in the event of "non-compliance", namely foreign military intervention. The resolution simply went far too far; essentially entailing regime change and sanctioning foreign military intervention.  Critics of Russia and China have been quick to question the motives of their decision without studying the substance of the resolution.  It has been surprising that little of the recent media coverage has touched upon the nature of the resolution itself and the enormity of the intrusion it would place upon another sovereign state.  These are important issues that should require a broader discussion, even when the country in question is being led by such a person as Assad. 

Syrian families gather at a shelter in Baba Amr neighborhood in Homs MSNBC

However, what is certainly most regrettable in this instance is that it is doubtful that China and Russia’s veto was a decision made with the best interests of the Syrian people at heart, but rather a geopolitical choice designed to ensure the survival of a Russian naval base in Tartus, a lucrative arms deal or a firmer presence in the region.  It would be hard to deny that the survival of Assad’s regime would be advantageous to both Moscow and Beijing.  Yet again, rival foreign powers are using the region as a geopolitical bargaining chip with little regard for the ensuing loss of life. 

It is deeply regrettable that Syria’s position as a strategic ally of Iran has turned a nation’s fight for political freedom into a highly toxic struggle between key global players.

In the face of such violence and brutality, arguing the case for non-intervention becomes increasingly difficult.  Indeed it appears that for many in the press and politics, intervention in the case of such a crisis becomes the knee-jerk logic. There have been increasing calls for intervention, especially following the failure of the UN resolution. U.S. White House Press Secretary Jay Carney commented "We definitely don't want to militarize the situation. But increasingly it looks like it may not be avoidable." The United Nations has also voiced plans to send observers into the country and the Saudis and Qataris are already reportedly arming and supporting the opposition.  There have also been suggestions that Turkey, with international support, could take a more central role, creating a buffer zone within Northern Syria for training and arming opposition forces.

An interesting article by Jonathan Freedland suggests that the opposition voiced by a number of people to liberal interventionism is an automatic reaction following the disastrous events of the 2003 Iraq war.  He believes that a blanket rejection of intervention in all cases is as dangerous as a blanket support of liberal interventionism. He may have a point.  However, if the case of Syria is viewed independently and dispassionately, it is clear that intervention poses serious risks.  In a country and a region that is such a fragile tinderbox, the slightest spark could prove destructive beyond belief. Indeed, the uprising is increasingly acquiring all of the dimensions of a sectarian conflict, as the largely Alawite security apparatus exploits minorities fears’ of a predominantly majority Sunni opposition.  We must allow the opposition to grow in strength and the regime to crumble from within.  This must be a time for change brought about by Syrians for Syria.  In such uncertain and unstable times, what is perhaps beyond doubt is that Assad has crossed a line from which there is no return.   

The Immunity Zone

Michael Young

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Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak believes that the oil embargo is not enough to force Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions. Lior Mizrahi/AFP/Getty Images.

On the 23^rd January the EU finally agreed to a new round of sanctions to impose against Iran over its nuclear programme, this time specifically targeting the country’s lucrative oil industry. These have been the harshest sanctions yet – EU member states together import approximately one-fifth of total Iranian oil, and once the sanctions are fully implemented later in the year they are sure to make a significant dent in the Iranian economy. Shortly after the announcement of further sanctions, an essay by Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman was published in the New York Times. After meeting with top Israeli officials in January, Bergman’s conclusion was clear: Israel IS going to launch a pre-emptive strike against Iran this year, and will probably do it this spring. 

According to Bergman, Israel has been asking itself three questions. One, does it have the ability to launch an attack, and protect itself from the counterattack? Two, have all diplomatic options been exhausted? And three, would Israel have the backing of the West if it were to launch an attack?

In regards to the first, Israel clearly has the technology and firepower available to launch an attack, however the issue would be defending the country from the hundreds of Iranian Shahab missiles that could easily be fired in the direction of Tel Aviv, not including the missiles that Hezbollah and Hamas could also launch. There has even been some speculation that Syria may feel compelled to back Iran. In regards to the second question, Israel would probably say that if the recent oil sanctions fail to make an impact, then all diplomatic options have been exhausted. 

The third question is the one that is most difficult to answer of all. If Israel were to strike Iran, what would be the reaction of allies such as the US and the UK?

Obama has recently said that it the US is working in ‘lockstep’ with Israel over Iran and will continue to support it, but that does not necessarily mean that if Israel chose to strike Iran tomorrow then the US would be right behind it. The incumbent president will have both eyes on popularity ratings until the November elections, and a military intervention in Iran is unlikely to go down well in Democrat strongholds. It is certainly the wrong time for the US to become embroiled in another war in the Middle East.

Iran’s Shahab-3 Missiles are well within range of Israel. FAS/Jane's Info Group.

But what does this mean for UK foreign policy?

Essentially, the government is able to take a back seat from now. The UK has played its part by being at the forefront of economic sanctions against Iran, and there is now little else it can do. Only time will tell whether the new sanctions will work, but it is of course quite possible that Israel will strike before they take full effect on July 1^st (they would have been implemented sooner if it wasn’t for crisis-hit Greece relying on Iranian oil). 

In the meantime, Stop the War’s ‘Don’t Attack Iran’ campaign is gaining momentum. Various politicians and celebrities recently took to a podium outside the American Embassy in Grosvenor Square calling for the West not to intervene in a country where there is no proof of a nuclear weapons programme. The campaign highlights ten reasons why the UK should not intervene, notably pointing out that wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya have all showed that intervention leads to high civilian casualties.

I share a similar view. Iran should be able to pursue a peaceful programme without Western interference. However, Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons would upset the balance of power in the region, and may fuel an arms race across the Middle East. Iran would also become untouchable – should it wish to torment its neighbours, it could do so without the threat of serious international condemnation as no state would be in a position to strategically argue with the regime. 

The ‘Immunity Zone’ is approaching. Israel believes that is has only nine months left to attack Iran, the US with their more advanced military forces have until mid-2013. Beyond that, Iran’s nuclear programme would be so advanced that a strike against it would be pointless – it would have reached ‘immunity’. The new sanctions will not come into full effect until July, which gives Iran five months to reassess the situation and hopefully come back to the negotiating table – the P5+1 talks would be a good start. It is now in Iran’s interest to open the dialogue with the West and resolve the issue for two main reasons – one, if the sanctions do have a serious economic impact then anti-Ahmadinejad protest could erupt across the country, threatening the regime. Two, Israel is serious about this – an anti-Iran sentiment is growing stronger, and some of the Israeli cabinet would not be shy of bombing Iran tomorrow.

The latest sanctions could be the last throw of the diplomatic dice. If crippling Iran’s economy does not make the regime submit to the demands of the West, it is hard to see what actually will. An attack on Iran will not stop its nuclear programme - if the regime is determined to acquire a nuclear weapon, it will succeed eventually. An attack would only delay the programme, and also make it more likely that it will want to use the weapon that it will develop. Not surprisingly, this is the biggest security dilemma that the West has faced in the Middle East since 2003.

Controversy over MI6 Libya Torture Investigation Worsens

Jevon Whitby

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 MI6 Building - Cadman - flickr

The ongoing controversy surrounding the metropolitan police's MI6 torture investigation was finally given a face last week, as the two men currently accusing the British security services, Sami al Saadi and Abdel Hakim Belhadj, named Sir Mark Allen as the senior officer responsible for  orchestrating their torture in Gaddafi's Libya in 2004.

Two fresh allegations have now developed from the discovered files of the defected ex-Libyan Intelligence Agency Chief Moussa Koussa. Embarrassingly, the revelation of the first British name comes less than three weeks since the investigation into MI6's conduct began, and coincides with the Ministry of Justice's attempts to request the controversial 'closedmaterial procedure' on sensitive case evidence, as was debated for the torture claims surrounding Bisher Al Rawi.

The accused, Sir Mark Allen, headed up the Secret Intelligence Service counter-terrorism unit in 2003/4, but resigned in 2004 after a failed bid to become head of MI6, moving to do lucrative work for BP in the Middle East. Despite his opposition of the Iraq war and the replacement head of MI6, Sir Mark was rumoured to be behind many secret deals with Libya, such as the release of Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi in August 2009. As the first such individual to be accused in the otherwise faceless torture investigation, he is expected to face a civil action for damages. Thus far he has declined to comment.

The new damning evidence has already drawn considerableinterest from civil rights campaigners. A letter from March 2004, allegedly from Sir Mark Allen himself, congratulates the Libyan Intelligence Agency on the safe arrival of Mr Belhadj and declares 'the intelligence on Abu Abd Allah [Mr Belhadj] was British.' Mr Belhadj, who now is now a commander for the Libyan rebels, claims his pregnant wife and children were included in the rendition to Gaddafi's Libya, away from international law, and that he was tied by the wrists and beaten whilst in the infamous Tajoura prison.

What will be the implications? Whilst the coalition has some insulation from the accusations on the grounds that the torture allegedly took place under a previous government, this is unlikely to be a distinction that will be noted in the international community. Complicity in torture (and collaboration with Gaddafi) is a stain that if true, will taint the reputation of Britain in general rather than that of a single party, despite the best public relations efforts to the contrary. As the current head of MI6, Sir John Sawers, declared in the service's official statement, MI6 will try to 'deal with the allegations' so that the UK can 'draw a line under them', but secret torture is a subject well suited to lasting international and media outrage.

A wounded prisoner of war inside a rebel run jail in Misrata, Libya © jeromestarkey: flickr

 In terms of foreign policy, the National Transitional Council are of course financially indebted to western allies and with Britain now politically invested in the 'new' Libya's success it is unlikely that the issue of past torture will truly drive a wedge between the two. However, expect the timing   to cause considerable diplomatic embarrassment and limit the opportunities of the current British government to trumpet the 'success' of their intervention into Libya. Mr Belhadj made the situation acutely awkward in a statement issued to Sky News, in which he insisted that the UK and Libya's future foreign relationship must 'start on a good footing' but requires 'justice for the crimes of the past.'

Ironically, the only partial saving grace for the British reputation may well result from the 'new' Libya's own improper conduct and alleged torture. Last week saw another embarrassing scandal emerge as U.N. human rights chief Navi Pillay and Amnesty International have both claimed to have evidence of ex-Gadaffi loyalists being whipped and beaten by prison guards working for the National Transitional Council. Aid workers from the French charity, Medecins Sans Frontieres, halted its work in protest to the alleged torture of detainees by the new Libyan regime, again in the notorious Tajoura prison. Sadly, the new Libya will be preoccupied with its own torture accusations in the immediate future.

If anything, these cases form yet another strong argument against the use of torture in difficult international investigations into terrorism. As the Arab Spring has shown, secretly repressive governments in the Middle-East do not necessarily remain 'secret,' or indeed as 'governments.' Even if one is not morally opposed, it is now impossible to deny that condoning torture can do as much harm as good in the long term. Should the allegations be found to be true, Sir Mark Allen will personally pay the price, as could Britain and Libya's promising diplomatic relationship. Worse still, the investigation continues...