Tunisia and the Rejection of Sharia Law

Jevon Whitby

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‘Salafist protesters wave flags and chant "Allahu Akbar" (God is Greatest) during a protest demanding for the inclusion of Islamic Law in the constitution in Tunis March 23, 2012. The flag reads "There is no god but Allah and Mohammad is the prophet". REUTERS/Zoubeir Souissi AJstream : Flickr

One of the biggest concerns expressed in the West about the Arab Spring was the potential rise of hard-line Islamist governments. 2011, the year in which regime change supposedly took much of the world by surprise, proved to be one in which a number of previously obscure opposition movements 'coalesced' in revolutionary action to oust incumbent governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and more. Understandably, some expressed concerns that the new regimes might well have unexpectedly radical agendas. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, whose slogan include the words 'the Quran is our constitution,' and the yet more conservative Salifist party, together hold more than half the seats in the People's Assembly.

Micols : Flickr (No Author/Flikr Caption) – (An Ennahda banner lies on the ground.)

 

Therefore it came as a surprise last week when Tunisia's governing coalition, the more moderate Ennahda party, ruled against instituting Sharia law. Despite an 8000 strong protest in the capital of Tunis, in which Salafi Islamists chanted such slogans as 'the people want a Caliphate,' the government declared against the wishes of the demonstrators. 

The decision instead means  maintaining the 'old' wording of the 1959 Tunisian Constitution, which reads: 'Tunisia is a free, sovereign and independent state, whose religion is Islam, language is Arabic and has a republican regime.'

Is this a political balancing act that can be maintained? Prime Minister Jebali and his Ennahda party control 89 of the Tunisian Assembly's 217 seats (roughly 41%,) and model their vision for Tunisia on the examples set by more moderate Islamic nations: such as Turkey or Indonesia. Nevertheless the party's founder Rached Ghannouchi, has indicated that the Ennahda consider the threat to be serious enough: admitting to Reuters that the Tunisian government has started careful talks with the Salafis on 'such sensitive subjects.'

Part of the difficulty is that the Salafis are not officially a political party. As a result the Ennahda have understandably found it difficult to negotiate or find a compromise, with Mr Ghannouchi now publicly encouraging the group to 'work in a legal framework in associations or in political parties.' Nevertheless the movement remains one of street protest and anger rather than political debate, with Tunisian news agencies broadcasting the Salafis' burning of American flags. Whilst the Ennahda insist that 'a dialogue is possible,' cases of violence between the Salafis and secular groups have escalated, not least at Manouba University in late February, where teachers were attacked and Tunisian flags torn down after authorities refused to allow the niqab to be worn in classes.

The reality is that Ennahda treads a fine consensus line to avoid alienating Tunisian voters. Officially an Islamist political movement itself, the Ennahda was once banned, its leader Mr Ghannouchi forced into exile in London until last January. Having risen to power the party now faces deep suspicions from the secular left and religious right, and is therefore insistent on being seen to stoically hold the political centre-ground. Mr Ghannouchi's daughter Intissar, who acts as his spokeswoman, demonstrated the official 'party line' most impressively; when questioned by the BBC over whether Tunisian women would be forced to wear head scarves, she replied: 'No-one will be forced to do anything, they are free to wear it or not wear it as they please.'

Magharebia: Flickr

Tunisian Constituent Assembly deputies on February 28th discuss the place of Islamic law in the new constitution.

That the Ennahda is promising not to illegalise alcohol, force women to wear the veil or alter the constitution may be minor issues to the international community, but it is a promising sign that the 'new' Tunisia would value smooth dealings with the West. Tunisia's considerable tourism industry (of which 60% is European) is recovering quickly, with the number of visitors in 2012 estimated to reach 84% of 2010 levels. Last month also saw UK Foreign Office minister Alastair Burt visit the 'new' Tunisia and stress the importance of continued political and economic stability, stating that 'the UK wants to be a close friend and partner;' indeed the coastal city of Sfax is a major asset to British Gas. Both give the Ennahda strong economic incentives to continue moderate policy, and to prevent Tunisia  from becoming a harsher, or even an 'anti-Western,' Islamic state.

Viewed from most angles, this attitude must surely be welcomed by the UK and the West in general. The Ennahda are clearly conscious of their fragile position, and keen to be a broad consensus government with which both a western secular democracy, or more a strongly Islamic nation, could stably do business. Precarious but constant balancing-acts on the place of state religion in government, the north-south division and east/west international relations are merits; all demonstrate political capability and democratic strength. Should the Ennahda become both Tunisia's 'natural' party of government, or even North Africa's only 'moderate' Islamic state, it could well be in the interest of all.