Israel loves Iran (or does it?)

Michael Young

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Talks between Iran and P5+1. Photo: Gettyimages.

The people of Israel are rightly becoming increasingly anxious. What lies in store for their country is far from certain – one week the headlines are that Tel Aviv is planning an imminent strike against Iranian nuclear facilities, the next week Iran has announced that it is prepared to enter into negotiations (which is normally followed by Israel playing down the suggestion that war is on the cards). As I stated in my previous article on the issue of the nuclear question, there are clearly many in the Israeli government that believe time is running out to halt the Iranian nuclear programme, and that a strike should be soon, regardless of the consequences. 

One group of Israelis, recognising this, have decided to act. The recently launched ‘Israel loves Iran’ campaign reflects the worry and uncertainty amongst ordinary citizens. It has gained momentum fast – their most recent video acquired over half a million views on YouTube within about 10 days. The message behind the campaign is powerful and all too often forgotten in war –‘we don’t even know you’. It is, of course, easier to judge opinion in Israel than in Iran, but it is certainly hard to see many Israelis supporting war, knowing that the consequences could easily be rockets from Iranian terrorist organisations in Palestine being directed towards them in response.  Whether or not the campaign becomes internationally renowned and effective may determine whether social networking could be used in this way to prevent war in the future.  

Whilst Iran may be in the later stages of Uranium enrichment, there IS still time to work with the regime and come to some sort of agreement. Sanctions are starting to bite and Iran is feeling the pressure – there are certainly signs that diplomacy could be working.

According to Reuters, A new round of talks are to be held in Turkey in April between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1). It’s been over a year now since the last of such talks in January 2011 broke down, and hopefully this spring will see some progress over the nuclear issue and not an Israeli airstrike as previously suggested by Leon Panetta. The fact remains that Iran does not currently possess nuclear weapons, and if Israel did strike then any weapons programme would be nothing other than delayed, simultaneously giving Iran a more conventional reason to detest the state other than anti-Zionism. Indeed, Iran would have more reason to pursue a weapon than ever before, making future confrontation highly likely. If talks are to happen, they have to happen soon – it was recently reported that later this year may see a conference in Helsinki designed to end the dispute diplomatically and perhaps even move towards a ban of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, but the fact that it is scheduled for December could be too little too late.

However, it has been well documented that Israel would have significant difficulty in implementing the attack successfully anyway, which could be a reason as to why it seems to have been recently relying on Mossad-led covert action instead. Iran’s nuclear programme is dispersed throughout the country at various underground sites – Fordo, for example, is 295 feet underground, and Israel simply do not possess the technology to destroy it. It would have to rely on a significant amount of help and firepower from the United States in order to annihilate Iran’s nuclear programme.

The UK is still waiting for sanctions to take full effect before it takes any further action, and the impact of sanctions will not be clear until either July, when they are comprehensively implemented, or if Iran gives in and concedes economic defeat before then, returning to the negotiating table. Yet with the ‘BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) recently suggesting that they are certainly not bound by sanctions against Iran, it is hard to see Iran having a severe problem shifting their oil in the immediate future. According to the FCO, Britain wants to restore good relations with Iran at some point, but not until the nuclear question has been solved. It has even set up a new website recently called ‘UK for Iranians’ with the objective of stimulating dialogue between the Iranian people and the UK to make up for the lack of an embassy in Tehran.

Any resolve on the issue is still far from imminent. Whilst the P5+1 states will go into any possible talks next month with only one objective – to get Iran to dismantle its nuclear programme – Iran might see this as an opportunity to gain some significant concessions in return. Tehran isn’t going to give up without a fight, especially as the West has dithered for some time now, allowing the programme to develop into an extensive, costly web of operations scattered throughout the country. Maybe the message that ‘Israel loves Iran’ will fully reach the Iranian people and the regime will be pressured to change course. Optimistic, to say the least. 

Engaging Moscow: Removing Asad without civil war

William Smith

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Friends Forever? The Kremlin may soon realise its regional interests are better served without Asad. CNN.

With a tentative ceasefire agreement that is almost certainly doomed to fail, and amid the UK’s promises to increase its material support for the opposition, the international community’s stance on Syria appears to be moving irrevocably beyond diplomacy. But is there an alternative to solving the crisis? As Russia starts to move away from its resolute support of Asad, the key may well be for the West to engage Moscow, and to take seriously its ‘strategic interests’ in Syria.

William Hague’s recent pledge to increase the UK’s material support for the Syrian opposition – along with similar promises from the US and the Gulf states – is a clear sign that the international community is rapidly losing patience with its tentative diplomatic approach to the crisis. Talk of ‘non-lethal aid’ is a euphemistic pledge of support to one side in a full-blown civil war. Indeed, there seems to be growing support amongst commentators for this sanitised and indirect approach as a means to hasten the downfall of the Asad regime, as evidenced by Paul Collier’s recent op-ed in the Financial Times.

But as numerous commentators have pointed out, a military solution in Syria – whether by foreign intervention or by arming the rebels – is likely to make things much worse, fuelling a sectarian conflict and ensuring regional instability for years to come. As an alternative, critics of militarisation see UN envoy Kofi Annan’s peace plan as a potential solution, and advocate a negotiated solution with the Asad regime.  While diplomacy should never be ruled out, and although the current ceasefire has yielded a (temporary) diminution of the violence, the outcome of the Anan plan will satisfy neither party in the conflict. For the opposition, a ceasefire does nothing to advance their demands for Asad to leave, while for the regime the full-implementation of the plan is a non-starter as it calls for political transition, something the regime is inherently incapable of doing.

In light of the desultory array of options available to the international community, is there really no alternative to militarisation or futile diplomacy? To many observers, Russia has long been the key to solving the Syrian crisis. Russian intransigence to the UN Security Council resolution against Asad in February was motivated by Russia’s economic and strategic interests in Syria, but also by a desire to teach the West a lesson for what it saw as NATO excesses in Libya. But as Middle East analyst Paul Salem points out, Moscow’s strategic calculus must inevitably change once it realises that Asad cannot cling to power long-term. Russia will not agree to the militarisation of the Syrian crisis, but it might be persuaded to abandon Asad in favour of the ‘controlled-collapse’ of the regime’s inner core. 

Bringing about a partial transition of the Syrian regime would equate to engineering a ‘palace coup’ – in effect, persuading mid to senior members of the government, security and armed forces that their only chance for political and even physical survival is to abandon Asad and his inner core of advisers. The regime’s inner circle has resolved to crushing the Syrian uprising by force; it has nothing to negotiate for, and will either win or die by the sword. So long as Western states continue to call for total regime change in Damascus, and the Syrian opposition offers ambiguous guarantees for religious minorities and current regime members, there has been little incentive for those outside of the inner circle to abandon Asad.

Such a move could be seen as a cynical betrayal of the Syrian people’s demands for a genuine political transformation, but it is perhaps the only solution that could avoid the inevitability of a bloodbath, precisely because it takes seriously the interests of both parties; moreover, it is not particularly different from the compromise solution pursued by Britain and the US in Yemen. If the West is prepared to allow only incremental change in countries where it has key ‘strategic interests’, such as Yemen and Bahrain, it should accept that Russia has similar concerns in Syria, and accept that a compromise solution in Syria that ends the violence and guarantees the interests of regime officials outside of the core elite, is perhaps the best option.

The idea of a ‘controlled demolition’ or palace coup is not as far-fetched as it may sound. According to a leaked diplomatic cable from 2006, US officials believed that military force would not be necessary to bring about regime change in Damascus, but that rather a “gesture of support” might be sufficient to encourage an internal regime coup. A second cable from the same year indicates that a “retired senior Alawite military officer” had tried to sound out US willingness to support a palace coup, and suggests that Asad’s popularity among the Alawi population as a whole was weak. A third cable, meanwhile, spells out the dilemma for non-elite regime figures more clearly – “Do regime pillars (mostly Alawite) stand with Asad and risk possibly losing power completely, or [do they] move against him?” 

The fact that Alawis and other regime figures have not moved against Asad since the start of uprising over a year ago is indicative of Asad’s success in playing the sectarian card, convincing wavering supporters that their only hope is to rally behind his rule. But it also suggests that Western states, along with the Syrian opposition, have not ensured sufficient guarantees for their future in a post-Asad Syria. For example, Western support for the opposition could have been made on condition of written guarantees and a political framework ensuring the protection of minorities and government officials; instead, visions of post-Asad politics remain vague, and the Muslim Brotherhood has indicated that its adherence to ‘pluralistic civil society’ is not the same thing as a secular society. 

Of course, it may well be too late to hope that regime figures will move against Asad and his clique, in which case nothing short of civil war is Syria’s most likely fate. But if, as it seems, Russia is starting to edge away from Asad, it might be the best compromise solution, and the only solution that avoids continuing the bloodshed. Shrill Western denunciations of Russia have done little to encourage Moscow to abandon its support for the Asad clique, but if Russia is starting to realise that its interests are best served in ensuring a ‘controlled transition’ in Damascus, the West should do more to engage it.   

Tunisia and the Rejection of Sharia Law

Jevon Whitby

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‘Salafist protesters wave flags and chant "Allahu Akbar" (God is Greatest) during a protest demanding for the inclusion of Islamic Law in the constitution in Tunis March 23, 2012. The flag reads "There is no god but Allah and Mohammad is the prophet". REUTERS/Zoubeir Souissi AJstream : Flickr

One of the biggest concerns expressed in the West about the Arab Spring was the potential rise of hard-line Islamist governments. 2011, the year in which regime change supposedly took much of the world by surprise, proved to be one in which a number of previously obscure opposition movements 'coalesced' in revolutionary action to oust incumbent governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and more. Understandably, some expressed concerns that the new regimes might well have unexpectedly radical agendas. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, whose slogan include the words 'the Quran is our constitution,' and the yet more conservative Salifist party, together hold more than half the seats in the People's Assembly.

Micols : Flickr (No Author/Flikr Caption) – (An Ennahda banner lies on the ground.)

 

Therefore it came as a surprise last week when Tunisia's governing coalition, the more moderate Ennahda party, ruled against instituting Sharia law. Despite an 8000 strong protest in the capital of Tunis, in which Salafi Islamists chanted such slogans as 'the people want a Caliphate,' the government declared against the wishes of the demonstrators. 

The decision instead means  maintaining the 'old' wording of the 1959 Tunisian Constitution, which reads: 'Tunisia is a free, sovereign and independent state, whose religion is Islam, language is Arabic and has a republican regime.'

Is this a political balancing act that can be maintained? Prime Minister Jebali and his Ennahda party control 89 of the Tunisian Assembly's 217 seats (roughly 41%,) and model their vision for Tunisia on the examples set by more moderate Islamic nations: such as Turkey or Indonesia. Nevertheless the party's founder Rached Ghannouchi, has indicated that the Ennahda consider the threat to be serious enough: admitting to Reuters that the Tunisian government has started careful talks with the Salafis on 'such sensitive subjects.'

Part of the difficulty is that the Salafis are not officially a political party. As a result the Ennahda have understandably found it difficult to negotiate or find a compromise, with Mr Ghannouchi now publicly encouraging the group to 'work in a legal framework in associations or in political parties.' Nevertheless the movement remains one of street protest and anger rather than political debate, with Tunisian news agencies broadcasting the Salafis' burning of American flags. Whilst the Ennahda insist that 'a dialogue is possible,' cases of violence between the Salafis and secular groups have escalated, not least at Manouba University in late February, where teachers were attacked and Tunisian flags torn down after authorities refused to allow the niqab to be worn in classes.

The reality is that Ennahda treads a fine consensus line to avoid alienating Tunisian voters. Officially an Islamist political movement itself, the Ennahda was once banned, its leader Mr Ghannouchi forced into exile in London until last January. Having risen to power the party now faces deep suspicions from the secular left and religious right, and is therefore insistent on being seen to stoically hold the political centre-ground. Mr Ghannouchi's daughter Intissar, who acts as his spokeswoman, demonstrated the official 'party line' most impressively; when questioned by the BBC over whether Tunisian women would be forced to wear head scarves, she replied: 'No-one will be forced to do anything, they are free to wear it or not wear it as they please.'

Magharebia: Flickr

Tunisian Constituent Assembly deputies on February 28th discuss the place of Islamic law in the new constitution.

That the Ennahda is promising not to illegalise alcohol, force women to wear the veil or alter the constitution may be minor issues to the international community, but it is a promising sign that the 'new' Tunisia would value smooth dealings with the West. Tunisia's considerable tourism industry (of which 60% is European) is recovering quickly, with the number of visitors in 2012 estimated to reach 84% of 2010 levels. Last month also saw UK Foreign Office minister Alastair Burt visit the 'new' Tunisia and stress the importance of continued political and economic stability, stating that 'the UK wants to be a close friend and partner;' indeed the coastal city of Sfax is a major asset to British Gas. Both give the Ennahda strong economic incentives to continue moderate policy, and to prevent Tunisia  from becoming a harsher, or even an 'anti-Western,' Islamic state.

Viewed from most angles, this attitude must surely be welcomed by the UK and the West in general. The Ennahda are clearly conscious of their fragile position, and keen to be a broad consensus government with which both a western secular democracy, or more a strongly Islamic nation, could stably do business. Precarious but constant balancing-acts on the place of state religion in government, the north-south division and east/west international relations are merits; all demonstrate political capability and democratic strength. Should the Ennahda become both Tunisia's 'natural' party of government, or even North Africa's only 'moderate' Islamic state, it could well be in the interest of all.

The Sound and the Fury: Britain’s response to the crisis in Syria

William Smith

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Angry Western denunciations, but Asad is not listening The Guardian - Reuters/Benoit Tessier

 In February, British Foreign Secretary William Hague described the crisis in Syria as an “utterly unacceptable situation which demands a united international response”. Yet from the beginning of the uprising one year ago, the UK – along with other Western states – has adopted a disjointed and uncertain stance. Strong on rhetoric, but showing little else, the government’s position reveals a deep-seated uncertainty on how best to respond to the crisis.

 If the ‘Arab Spring’ took Western policymakers by surprise, then the uprising in Syria has created a diplomatic headache with no apparent remedy, just a host of unattractive options that are likely to make things much worse before they get better.  The US has been caught between its longstanding desire to get rid of the Asad regime – and thus deal a major strategic blow to Iran – and its fears of destabilising the entire Middle East region (compare recent statements by hawks such as John McCain and former Bush-adviser Elliot Abrams with the more cautious approach of Obama administration figures such as Leon Panetta.) In the UK, where the Iranian issue plays a less crucial role in policy debates, public and government opinion has so far steered well clear of intervention. Aside from sanctions (which will have a debilitating effect on the Asad regime long-term, but will do nothing to stop the immediate bloodshed), the response has been mostly rhetorical. The UK approach has been the ‘do nothing’ approach; in time, it is hoped, the headache will simply sort itself out and go away.

This inconsistent and hands-off approach has been evident from the start of the crisis. In the first months of the uprising, British officials expressed their hope that the Asad regime would follow through with its promises of political reform. Discussing the Syrian president, William Hague insisted it was possible to see him “as a reformer”, and said he believed Asad was “interested” in bringing about change. Yet to any serious observer of Syrian politics, the idea of Asad as a reformer was nothing more than a transient myth that was laid to rest with the repression of the ‘Damascus Spring’ in the early 2000s. The Syrian regime, in which power is invested in a small circle of family members and security personnel surrounding the president, buttressed by extensive systems of patronage, is inherently incapable of reform. Any attempt to bring about meaningful reform would destroy the very basis of the regime itself, as Syria analyst Joshua Landis argues here. Thus optimistic western statements about the possibility of reform were almost as vacuous as Asad’s promises themselves. Hague’s comments were less a genuine expectation that Syria would move towards reform and democracy, than a hope that an awkward geopolitical situation could resolve itself with minimum Western involvement – more akin to the situation in Bahrain and Yemen than to Libya.

The UK’s determination to remain on the sidelines was further demonstrated by its repeated insistence that there was not even “a remote possibility” of a Libya-style intervention in Syria, an effective green-light for the regime to deal with the uprising ‘in house’. When the horrific scale of the regime’s crackdown forced a stronger response, Hague’s demand that Asad stand-down carried little weight without even the pretence of possible coercive force to back it up. Again, the government’s backing for an Arab League plan that would see Asad hand over power to a deputy was at best a token gesture and at worst a woeful misreading of the nature of the Syrian regime. Any member of the regime’s inner elite is almost certain to share the same strategic calculations as the president, and will continue the ‘security option’ to the very end.

There is, of course, no obvious way for any outside power to solve the crisis in Syria. In a candid assessment of British options, Hague admitted that the levers the government had were very limited, and the adoption of a more ‘realist’ UK foreign policy would be a welcome change from the ideological hubris of the Blair era. Nevertheless, we should not mistake adopting strong rhetoric for adopting a strong stand against Damascus. Moreover, Britain’s approach, for all its bluster, seems to be one of resignation to the inevitability of full-blown civil war in Syria. In one sense, Russia and China’s veto spared the West the difficult task of turning a Security Council resolution condemning Syria into concrete measures to end the violence.

Despite the manifest changes in the Middle East in the post-Cold War era, it is clear that the Syrian people remain the hostage of great power politics just as they were during the regime’s brutal crackdown in the 1980s. In 1982, in the aftermath of the Hama massacre, the then Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd was pressed by a fellow MP to raise the issue of Syrian human rights abuses at the UN. Hurd replied that the UK government would do nothing: “I do not think representations to the United Nations would bring about the result that the hon. Member has in mind”, he said, adding that “the Syrian Government are well aware of our views on human rights […] one has to ask oneself whether intervention with the Government concerned will do any good or whether it is likely to make matters worse.” This time around, the UK has protested in the strongest possible terms, but just as in 1982 it has found itself unable to offer any substantive help. For the victims of the Asad regime, the sound and fury of the UK’s rhetoric has signified not very much at all.  

Yemen - What Lies Ahead?

Michael Young

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Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi was sworn in as president. Mohammed Huwais/Agence France-Presse - Getty Images.

In a sense, the people of Yemen have emerged largely victorious out of the Arab uprisings that have shaken the region since early 2011. In November last year, Yemen’s president of thirty-three years Ali Abdullah Saleh finally announced that he was going to step down amid mounting protest and rising violence. However he only announced this once he could be sure that he will be immune from any prosecution, and his family can still control most of Yemen including the armed forces. His successor, Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi, was sworn in as president just last month after elections which have been hailed as representing a ‘new beginning’ for Yemen (despite there being only one candidate to choose from on the ballot, and him winning by 99.6% of the vote). Yemen is therefore going through its first political transition for the first time in a generation, but what lies ahead for the poorest country in the Middle East which is on the verge of economic collapse and currently a hotspot for al-Qaeda?

The change in Yemen received much less Western media coverage than that prescribed to countries such as Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and arguably Bahrain. In recent years, the main stories to come out of Yemen have focused on the presence of affiliate ‘Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’ (AQAP) within the country, supposedly operating as an affiliate of al-Qaeda itself. But with the killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki by a US drone last year, which Obama labelled as a “major blow to al-Qaeda’s most operational affiliate”, it is clear that the West has taken upon itself to disrupt terrorist operations in the country. 

The situation in Yemen is important. Since the failed Christmas Day bombing of a US airliner over Detroit, and the failed Cargo Plane bombs in 2010, Yemen is now considered as a stronghold for al-Qaeda inspired terrorism – a place where terrorists can easily plan, plot and organise attacks against targets in Europe and the US. Any instability in Yemen provides terrorists with an opportunity to expand and recruit – in fact, it is thought that the West were initially hesitant to accept that Saleh must go, due to his compliance with the West over the issue of al-Qaeda and the fact that collapse of the regime and the resulting anarchy could enable al-Qaeda to take an even stronger presence in the country. Saleh had been submissive to the demands of the West and was a vital ally against al-Qaeda in the region, allowing the US to train Yemeni personnel in the fight against AQAP. 

Upon being sworn into office, Hadi vowed to continue the war on al-Qaeda in the country just like his predecessor. Yet the first terrorist incident in the country under the new regime occurred within just hours of his inauguration, when a car bomb in the south-east city of Mukalla exploded, killing 26. It is clear that the new regime is going to need a considerable amount of help from the West to combat al-Qaeda. Since the attempted Christmas Day and Cargo Plane bombings, the US recognises that it needs to invest heavily in counterterrorism in the country. It is reportedly spending tens or maybe hundreds of millions on it, mainly training Yemeni soldiers.

It is not simply al-Qaeda which is causing divisiveness in Yemen – the country has the problem of many different tribal factions competing for power. There are secessionist movements operating in a South and have been for some time – they are unlikely to be appeased by the Hadi. Rebel tribes have made themselves known in recent years, attacking oil pipelines which have made the availability of oil even scarcer – Yemen is forced to now import oil from neighbouring countries, driving up the price even further. There is also a serious water shortage, and it is thought that Sana’a could be the world’s first capital city to run out of water.

Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle East, and its economy has been close to collapsing, even before the unrest started last year. Unemployment is high, food prices are constantly rising, and power cuts are daily – all of which contributed to the discontent against Saleh last year. It is thought that through this domestic struggle, and most notably through the poverty which is rife in the country, that al-Qaeda is managing to garner support.

It is unclear what the UK’s current attitude is towards Yemen. The government seems to be acting prudent, largely leaving the US to combat the al-Qaeda splinter group within the country. Hopefully the regime change will bring about the stability that the Yemeni people so badly need, and Hadi will address the internal problems that are not only plaguing the country’s economy but also strengthening al-Qaeda. A strong, stable and anti-extremist Yemen is in the interest of the UK and the West – it is one of the only countries in the region that al-Qaeda seem currently able to operate with ease. From a counterterrorism perspective, securing Yemen should be a foreign policy objective for 2012.